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This study examines whether OCI items impact the market’s ability to process earnings in the 
contexts of uncertainty/disagreement among market participants and value-relevance.  We find 
that earnings and OCI gains and losses are individually associated with reduced market 
uncertainty/disagreement and are positively impounded into share prices by investors.  However, 
we also find that both OCI gains and (especially) losses interact with earnings, weakening 1) the 
negative relation between earnings and market uncertainty/disagreement and 2) the value-
relevance of earnings.  Further, we find that the apparent effects of OCI gains and losses on the 
market’s processing of earnings information are stronger in weak information environments, as 
measured by analyst following.  Our findings suggest that OCI conveys information to the 
market that is useful but also noisy, thereby potentially hindering the market’s ability to interpret 















OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME AND THE MARKET’S  
PROCESSING OF EARNINGS INFORMATION 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
An extensive literature has evolved over the last three decades that examines the value-
relevance of earnings and factors associated therewith (Barth et al. 2017).  A related literature 
explores the extent to which an expanded measure of economic performance, comprehensive 
income, is impounded into share prices.  Branches of this literature explore the comparative 
value-relevance of earnings and comprehensive income (e.g., Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; 
Chambers et al. 2007; Dhaliwal et al. 1999; O’Hanlon and Pope 1999) and (separately) the 
value-relevance of individual components of “other comprehensive income” (e.g., Louis 2003; 
Cahan et al. 2000) with mixed findings.  We contribute to both literatures by examining whether 
“other comprehensive income” (OCI) items impact market participants’ ability to process other 
accounting information.  Specifically, we explore whether 1) the associations between earnings 
and measures of uncertainty and disagreement among market participants and 2) the value-
relevance of earnings are affected by the presence of OCI gain and losses.  
According to SFAS No. 130, OCI is comprised of positive and negative economic 
performance items that are included in comprehensive income but not in net income, such as 
unrealized gains and losses on certain investments, minimum liability pension adjustments, and 
foreign currency translation adjustments.  The components of OCI generally represent unrealized 
economic gains and losses stemming from fluctuations in markets prices, foreign currency 
exchange rates, etc.   
Several studies provide evidence that comprehensive income and/or OCI items convey 
information that useful to market participants toward establishing share prices (e.g., 
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Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Chambers et al. 2007; Biddle and Choi 2006; Louis 2003; Dhaliwal 
et al. 1999; O’Hanlon and Pope 1999).  However, other studies (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 1999) find 
that comprehensive income has less explanatory power for stock prices than net income, calling 
into question the incremental usefulness of OCI in measuring economic performance.  Moreover, 
some prior studies find that OCI lacks persistence and predictability and tends to be volatile in 
nature (Black 2016; Rees and Shane 2012; Jones and Smith 2011).  Arguably consequently, prior 
evidence also suggests that OCI items are relatively poor predictors of future profitability (e.g., 
Pronobis and Zulch 2010; Kanageretnam et al. 2009). 
To the extent that the unpredictable and volatile nature of OCI items introduce added 
uncertainty to the process of evaluating firms’ financial reports, they may constrain the overall 
usefulness of accounting numbers (Linsmeier et al. 1997).  Indeed, recent research supports the 
notion that OCI is a noisy measure of economic performance; for example, Khan and Bradbury 
(2014) find that comprehensive income is associated with market-based measures of risk 
(namely, volatility of stock returns and beta).  We argue that OCI gains and losses affect the way 
that market participants processes other accounting information, generating uncertainty and 
disagreement around that information.  Based on prior evidence that uncertainty negatively 
impacts market participants’ ability to process accounting information (e.g., Imhoff and Lobo 
1992), we predict that the association between earnings and investor heterogeneity is stronger in 
the presence of OCI. 
Using a sample of 13,455 firm-year observations over the 2001-2016 period and multiple 
measures of market uncertainty/disagreement (i.e., analyst earnings forecast dispersion, analyst 
earnings forecast errors, and stock return volatility), we find that reported earnings and OCI 
gains and losses are individually associated with reduced uncertainty and disagreement among 
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market participants and are positively impounded into share prices by investors.  However, we 
also find that both OCI gains and losses interact with earnings so as to weaken the negative 
relation between earnings and market uncertainty/disagreement and the value-relevance of 
earnings.  Further, we find that the negative effects of OCI items on the market’s ability to 
process earnings are more consistently evident for OCI losses than OCI gains.  Finally, we find 
that the apparent effects of OCI gains and losses on market participants’ processing of earnings 
information manifest more strongly in weaker information environments than in stronger ones, 
as measured by analyst following. 
These results suggest that although OCI gains and losses provide useful information to 
market participants directly, as several prior studies have found, they also have a negative 
indirect effect on market participants’ ability to assess firms’ fundamentals.  Our results also 
imply that a stronger information environment provides market participants with the tools to 
generally retain the informational benefits provided by OCI items directly while mitigating any 
confusing or noisy elements contained therein that may affect interpretation of other financial 
statement items. 
Our study contributes the broad literature examining the effects of accounting information on 
the market in multiple ways.  First, as noted previously, an extensive literature has sought to 
understand the value-relevance of earnings and the factors that impact it (e.g., Barth et al. 2017).  
We contribute to this line of inquiry by providing evidence that the value-relevance of earnings 
is affected by other accounting information that may introduce added uncertainty to market 
participants as they assess and interpret earnings information.  Further, most studies examining 
how the market processes OCI items have focused on the general value-relevance of OCI items 
and/or how the value-relevance of comprehensive income compares with that of earnings (e.g., 
 4 
 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Chambers et al. 2007; Louis 2003; Cahan et al. 2000; Dhaliwal et al. 
1999; O’Hanlon and Pope 1999).  We extend this literature by considering the potential 
interactive effects of OCI gains and losses with other accounting information in the context of 
market reactions, specifically how OCI items impact the associations between earnings and 1) 
uncertainty and disagreement among market participants and 2) stock returns. 
Section II provides a review of the prior literature and the development of our hypotheses.  
Section III discusses our research methods and data used to test how OCI gains and losses impact 
1) the association between earnings and market uncertainty/disagreement and 2) the value-
relevance of earnings.  Section IV presents the results of our analyses, and Section V presents 
our concluding remarks.  
 
II.  PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Institutional Background 
As mandated by Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 130, firms are 
required to report comprehensive income as a separate item in their financial statements.  
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 6 defines comprehensive income as 
“the change in equity [net assets] of a business enterprise during a period from transactions and 
other events and circumstances from nonowner sources.  It includes all changes in equity during 
a period except those resulting from investments by owners and distributions to owners.”  
Accordingly, the major components of comprehensive income are net income and a collection of 
“other comprehensive income” (OCI) items. 
SFAS No. 130 defines OCI as all “revenues, expenses, gains, and losses that under generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are included in comprehensive income but excluded 
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from net income.”  It includes items such as unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale 
(AFS) securities pursuant to SFAS No. 115 and cash-flow hedges, the net loss associated with 
the minimum liability pension adjustment pursuant to SFAS No. 87, and foreign currency 
translation adjustments pursuant to SFAS No. 52 (Black 2016; Skinner 1999).  The principal aim 
of SFAS No. 130 is to mitigate clean surplus violations through mandated reporting of a new 
performance measure (i.e., comprehensive income) in addition to net income that is intended to 
include net income as well as the effects of unrealized economic gains and losses stemming from 
fluctuations in markets prices, foreign currency exchange rates, and the like.  
Value-Relevance of OCI 
Over the years, OCI has proven to be contentious in financial reporting (Cahan et al. 2000).  
In a 1993 report, the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) strongly 
supported disclosure of separate comprehensive income items, stating:  
We have profound misgivings about the increasing number of wealth changes that elude 
disclosure on the income statement.  Yet individual items may be interpreted differently.  
That calls for the display of comprehensive income that allows components of different 
character to be seen and evaluated separately (AIMR 1993, p. 63). 
 
Such is the rationale for adequate disclosure of separate OCI components; inadequate OCI 
disclosure could conceivably lead to the discounting of these items by analysts and investors.  
The FASB suggests that although total comprehensive income is useful as an aggregate measure, 
information pertaining to individual components is also necessary to allay concerns that the total 
measure conveys only a limited understanding of overall enterprise activity.  In 1995, the AIMR 
issued a report indicating that at least some of the OCI components are value-relevant.  
Nevertheless, when the initial exposure draft of the comprehensive income disclosure 
standard (i.e. SFAS No. 130) was issued by the FASB in June 1996, not all parties held the 
additional measure in favorable regard.  One cited reproach of the ensuing change was that the 
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introduction of an additional performance measure (i.e., comprehensive income) might confuse 
users (Cahan 2000).  Opponents generally argue that OCI lacks predictability and tends to be 
volatile in nature (Black 2016). 
Weighing in on the ongoing debate as to whether OCI is incrementally informative, extant 
OCI research provides empirical evidence, albeit mixed, that OCI is value-relevant.  Chambers et 
al. (2007) examine the pricing of aggregate OCI and find that OCI is priced on a dollar-for-dollar 
basis.  As for the components of OCI, Chambers et al. (2007) also find the adjustments for 
foreign currency translations and unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale investments to 
be value-relevant; these components of OCI provide price-relevant information that is 
incremental to that provided by net income in the post-SFAS No. 130 time period.  
Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) also find that components of OCI are value-relevant for a 1998 to 
2003 sample of Canadian firms.  Louis (2003) takes a more narrow focus to specifically examine 
the economic implications of foreign currency translation adjustments for manufacturing firms, 
finding that the information contained in foreign currency translation adjustments is associated 
with a decrease in firm value.  Two similar studies also examine the value-relevance of foreign 
currency translation adjustments (Dhaliwal et al. 1999; O’Hanlon and Pope 1999).   
Some recent research has questioned the usefulness of OCI components from a couple 
different perspectives (Rees and Shane 2012).  One stream of the research broadly addresses 
whether earnings or comprehensive income constitute a better summary measure for firm 
performance (Barton et al. 2010; Pronobis and Zulch 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 1999).  Another 
related branch of the literature instead adopts an informational perspective and questions whether 
OCI items truly provide decision-useful information to financial statement users.  Of this stream 
of decision-usefulness literature, researchers generally focus on OCI as a whole (Kanagaretnam 
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et al. 2009; Chambers et al. 2007; Dhaliwal et al. 1999; O’Hanlon and Pope 1999), but some also 
focus more narrowly on the individual components of OCI (Campbell 2010; Louis 2003; Bartov 
1997; Barth et al. 1996).   
Several studies cast doubt on whether comprehensive income represents a better measure of 
firm performance than net income.  For instance, Dhaliwal et al. (1999) fail to find evidence 
indicating that comprehensive income is more strongly associated with market value or better 
predicts future cash flows than net income.  They provide empirical evidence demonstrating that 
comprehensive income has relatively less explanatory power for stock prices than net income.  
On the other hand, Biddle and Choi (2006) compare distinct measures of income from 
comprehensive income components through use of SFAS No. 130 adoption (1997) as a natural 
experiment.  Contrary to Dhaliwal et al. (1999), they find comprehensive income to explain 
annual returns better than both net income and the change in retained earnings plus common 
stock dividends. 
Chambers et al. (2007) also examine the pricing of OCI through analyzing the correlation 
between returns and comprehensive income.  They find that OCI does yield incrementally value-
relevant information beyond net income in the post-SFAS No. 130 era.  Specifically, they 
conclude that foreign currency translation adjustments and unrealized gains and losses on 
available-for-sale investments are value-relevant, providing incremental price-relevant 
information beyond net income in the post-SFAS No. 130 era.  Similarly, Cahan et al. (2000) 
examine the incremental value-relevance of separate comprehensive income components in 
relation to both total comprehensive income and net income using a sample of New Zealand 
firms, finding total comprehensive income to be the most value-relevant.   
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Research also examines whether the value-relevance of OCI items relative to net income is 
affected by whether OCI components are disclosed in the statement of changes in shareholders’ 
equity (SCE).  Ohlson (1995) shows that, under clean surplus accounting, the value of the firm is 
a function of net book value and abnormal earnings.  Cahan et al. (2000) build on the Ohlson 
(1995) framework to weigh in on this debate as to whether comprehensive income disclosures in 
the statement of changes in equity are useful.  They do not find evidence to support that the 
separate OCI items are incrementally value-relevant above and beyond comprehensive income.  
They also do not find OCI items to be incrementally value-relevant relative to net income after 
the SCE was required.   
However, other recent evidence indicates that investors consistently price OCI when the 
measure is reported in the SCE, but not when it is reported in a separate statement of 
comprehensive income (Lin et al. 2016).1  Moreover, Schaberl and Victoravich (2015) find a 
decline in value-relevance of OCI for firms required to alter OCI reporting location from the 
statement of equity to a performance statement in response to ASU 2011-05.  Chambers et al. 
(2007) also finds that the type of financial statement in which the firm elects to report OCI 
affects pricing; investors tend to lend more attention to OCI information that is reported on the 
SCE as opposed to the statement of financial performance.  Despite policymaker’s preference for 
the reporting of comprehensive income in a performance statement for transparency purposes, 
Bamber et al. (2010) find that a large number of firms still report comprehensive income in the 
SCE.  Bamber et al. (2010) provides evidence that managers behave as if the comprehensive 
income reporting location is of consequence.   
                                                          
1 Investors value OCI reported in the separate statement of comprehensive income only in the financial crisis period 
when the magnitude and volatility of OCI are more significant (Lin et al. 2016). 
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OCI as a Noisy Measure of Economic Outcomes 
Particularly given the central importance of the OCI debate, the apparent divergence of 
empirical evidence regarding the value-relevance of such information can be taken as an 
indication that further research in this area is warranted.  The research at hand seeks to weigh in 
on this discussion through examination of whether OCI conveys information to the market that is 
useful but also noisy, thereby potentially hindering market participants’ ability to interpret 
earnings.  Purportedly, clear identification of separate comprehensive income components could 
allow investors to better estimate firm value.  However, while the prior research has provided 
evidence to support the claim that OCI is value-relevant, there is not a clear means for 
differentiating between earnings and OCI in the FASB Conceptual Framework, and the 
measurement of OCI items often involves a degree of inherent uncertainty and/or requires 
substantial managerial judgment.   
As of now, conceptual standard setting has failed to provide clear guidance to differentiate 
between economic transactions that flow to net income and OCI.  An official definition of 
conceptual differences between the items of net income versus those appearing in OCI in 
consolidated financial reports does not exist.  Research has documented that this lack of 
definitional clarity has resulted in ad hoc classifications of OCI components (Rees and Shane 
2009).  Black (2016) cites examples of instances where comparable economic transactions flow 
through both net income and OCI.  Namely, such instances include unrealized gains and losses 
on trading securities (net income) versus AFS securities (OCI) and unrealized gains and losses 
on fair value hedge instruments (net income) versus cash-flow hedge instruments (OCI).  Most 
of the OCI items are transitory or result from “noisy market price movements” (Black 2016).  It 
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follows that such OCI components may not necessarily present a clear picture of the underlying 
changes in the firm’s fundamental economic position. 
Paired with this documented definitional ambiguity, OCI reporting also involves an inherent 
degree of uncertainty; OCI is generally composed of mark-to-market adjustments that likely are 
more susceptible to managerial judgment.2  Dhaliwal et al. (2012) state, “some components of 
OCI may involve more subjective estimates, thereby adding noise to financial reporting.”  When 
an active market for a security does not exist, managerial estimates are permitted in accordance 
with FASB and SEC guidance.  Components of OCI are affected by such managerial discretion 
over the choice of valuation methods, thereby casting a degree of uncertainty on the quality of 
the fair-value estimates and related financial information (Lee et al. 2013).   
Dirty surplus accounting (i.e., OCI) could represent a source of error in valuation models 
(Linsmeier et al. 1997).  Isidro et al. (2006) document a relation between valuation errors and 
dirty surplus flows for U.S. firms.  Based on fair value measurement and disclosure, level-1 
assets and liabilities represent quoted prices obtained from active markets in which identical 
assets or liabilities may be observed.  One would expect level-2 and level-3 measurements 
contained in OCI to require more overall subjectivity and managerial judgment as compared to 
level-1 measurements because quoted prices are not readily available for an identical asset or 
liability. 
Concern regarding lack of OCI transparency is not new to the accounting literature (Isidro et 
al. 2006); the idea that such uncertainty surrounding dirty surplus accounting might constrain the 
overall usefulness of accounting numbers has been historically acknowledged (Linsmeier et al. 
                                                          
2 Such mark-to-market adjustments are derived from instances such as interest rate changes, and exchange rates (Lee 
and Park 2013). 
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1997; Paton 1934).  Recent research also corroborates this notion of a “noisy” OCI measure by 
demonstrating that comprehensive income is more volatile than net income.  Khan and Bradbury 
(2014) document that comprehensive income is associated with market-based measures of risk 
(namely, volatility of stock returns and beta).  Lee et al. (2013) find that the OCI of Big 4 clients 
is more value-relevant than that of non-Big 4 clients.  The research extends to demonstrate that, 
for the more subjective OCI components, the valuation effect is more pronounced relative to the 
less subjective components.3 
Although components of OCI are found to be value-relevant, the items are also found to be 
poor predictors of future profitability.  It is speculated that this lack of predictability is, at least in 
part, due to the transitory nature of the OCI items.  In a German IFRS setting, Pronobis and 
Zulch (2010) document that comprehensive income does not have better predictive power for 
firm operating performance than net income.  For a sample of Canadian companies that are 
cross-listed in the United States, Kanageretnam et al. (2009) examine whether mandating 
comprehensive income and component reporting yields incrementally value-relevant information 
to the securities market over the traditional historical cost earnings approach.  They find net 
income to better predict future net income than comprehensive income, although comprehensive 
income is a better predict future cash flows from operations than net income. 
For explaining abnormal returns, Cheung and Cheung (1993) find comprehensive income to 
be an inferior measure relative to both operating income and net income.  They also find both 
operating income and net income to be superior to comprehensive income in information 
content.  Jones and Smith (2011) also extend this line of research through demonstrating that 
                                                          




both special items and OCI are returns relevant.  However, special items are found to be more 
returns relevant than OCI gains and losses.  Jones and Smith (2011) find OCI gains and losses to 
be value-relevant, but find comprehensive income and OCI to be less predictable than net 
income.  They, along with Rees and Shane (2012), also demonstrate that the degree of 
persistence of OCI components is relatively low.  Research by Barton et al. (2010) provide 
additional empirical evidence attesting to the lack of predictability associated with OCI.  Of eight 
performance measures under consideration, they find comprehensive income to be the least 
predictable of these measures in an international context.   
Implications of OCI for the Market’s Ability to Evaluate Earnings Information  
Based on the premise that OCI decreases the precision of investor beliefs regarding the 
parameters of the distribution of cash flows, we hypothesize that the association between 
earnings and investor heterogeneity is stronger in the presence of OCI.  Ceteris paribus, greater 
fundamental uncertainty surrounding a firm’s future cash flows will likely result in larger stock 
price responses to value-relevant information (Imhoff and Lobo 1992).  It has been suggested 
that low visibility surrounding dirty surplus flows may compromise value-relevance (O’Hanlon 
and Pope 1999) and thereby affect the way that the market processes accounting information.  
Noisy information conveys a signal with compromised information content (Holthausen and 
Verrecchia 1988).  To the extent that this lack of clarity surrounding OCI hinders market 
interpretation of accounting information, one might expect a substantive increase in investor 
uncertainty and disagreement about firm fundamentals in the presence of an ambiguous OCI 
measure.  Accordingly, we predict that the association between earnings and measures of market 
uncertainty/disagreement is increasing in the magnitude of OCI items.  We state this prediction 
in alternative form below as: 
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H1:  The association between earnings and market uncertainty becomes more strongly 
positive or weakly negative as the magnitude of OCI gains and/or losses increases. 
 
To the extent that OCI items impact the market’s processing of earnings information as 
predicted in H1, we would also expect the impounding of earnings information into share prices 
to be affected by OCI.  Imhoff and Lobo (1992) provide evidence of a higher association 
between unexpected returns and unexpected earnings when the information uncertainty is low.  If 
additional information uncertainty is introduced, the association between earnings and returns 
might be expected to weaken.  As such, we predict that the value-relevance of earnings is 
decreasing in the magnitude of OCI items.  We state this prediction in alternative form below as: 
H2:  The association between earnings and stock returns becomes more weakly positive or 
strongly negative as the magnitude of OCI gains and/or losses increases. 
 
III.  RESEARCH METHODS 
Empirical Model 
To investigate the extent (if any) to which OCI gains and losses impact the market’s 
processing of earnings, we estimate an industry and year fixed effects model in which we regress 
measures of market uncertainty on earnings, OCI gains and losses, interactions between the two, 
and a set of control variables as follows (subscripts suppressed; see Appendix A for detailed 
variable descriptions): 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑂𝐶𝐼𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 + 𝜃2𝑂𝐶𝐼𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝜃3𝐸𝑟𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝜃4𝐸𝑟𝑛𝑔𝑠 × 𝑂𝐶𝐼𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 +
𝜃5𝐸𝑟𝑛𝑔𝑠 × 𝑂𝐶𝐼𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝜃6𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑉𝑎𝑙 + 𝜃7𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝜃8𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 + 𝜃9𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙 +
𝜃10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀  
(
(1) 
Market represents the dependent variables used in our model, all of which proxy for some 
aspect of market uncertainty.  AnaDisp is analyst earnings forecast dispersion, and it reflects 
market uncertainty via divergence of opinion among analysts about future earnings (e.g., 
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Comprix et al. 2011; Diether et al. 2002; Barron and Stuerke 1998; Ajinkya et al. 1991).  
Similarly, AnaInacc captures the absolute value of bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts (Duru and 
Reeb 2002; Clement 1999; Brown 1993; Brown et al. 1985).  Return volatility (RetVol) also 
reflects market uncertainty, but via disagreement among investors about firm fundamentals 
(Comprix et al. 2011; Berkman et al. 2009; Zhang 2006).  Finally, as discussed above, to the 
extent that market uncertainty negatively affects investors’ ability to process earnings, we would 
expect the association between earnings and stock returns to be weaker in the presence of higher 
uncertainty (i.e., potential mispricing; Imhoff and Lobo 1992).  Accordingly, our fourth market-
related dependent variable is cumulative abnormal stock return (CumRet). 
Our primary independent variables of interest are Erngs, OCIGain, OCILoss, and (especially) 
the interactions between Erngs and the two OCI variables.  Erngs is net income before 
extraordinary items.  OCIGain and OCILoss represent the absolute values of gains and losses, 
respectively, in other comprehensive income arising from derivatives, securities, currency 
translation adjustments, noncontrolling interests, minimum pension adjustments, and other 
adjustments.  A positive (negative) coefficient on Erngs*OCIGain and/or Erngs*OCILoss would 
support H1 (H2). 
Included among our control variables is firm size, which is defined as book value of equity 
(BookVal).  In our models where the dependent variable is defined based on share prices (i.e., 
RetVol and CumRet), we also employ the log of the number of shares outstanding (OutShrs; θ11) 
as an additional control for firm size.  Studies find mixed results for firm size in models of 
market uncertainty-related constructs (Dai et al. 2010; Rogers et al. 2009; Shores 1990; Atiase 
1985).  We also include fixed assets (PPE) and intangible assets (Intang) as controls.  PPE is net 
property, plant, and equipment scaled by total beginning assets, and Intang is intangible assets 
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including goodwill scaled by total beginning assets.  Relative levels of fixed assets and 
intangible assets may reflect firms’ inherent operational uncertainty, although some studies find 
that firms with more intangible assets attract more analyst following, arguably resulting in an 
improved information environment (e.g., Barth et al. 2001).  Finally, we control for the volatility 
of operating cash flows (CFVol) and earnings (ROAVol) because more volatile performance is 
likely to contribute positively to market uncertainty.  
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We obtain financial statement data from the Compustat Industrial Annual File, stock returns from 
the Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP) Daily Return files, and analyst forecasts from 
I/B/E/S.  We eliminate observations lacking data necessary to calculate dependent variables, 
explanatory variables of interest (i.e., earnings and OCI gains/losses), and/or required control 
variables.  The sample selection procedure generates a final full sample of 13,455 firm years covering 
the period from 2001 to 2016.  Within each year, we winsorize the dependent variables and main 
independent variables at the top and bottom 0.5 percent of the sample distribution. 
We report industry membership of the sample firms in Table 1 and, as a benchmark for 
comparison, all firms on Compustat in 2010 (largest concentration of firm-years toward the 
middle of the sample period). Industry definitions are based on the aggregation of similar two-
digit SIC classifications (defined in the notes to Table 1).  With one exception, industry 
representation of our sample firms is generally consistent with that of firms in the broader 
Compustat database.  The exception, for which industry membership differs notably from the 
industry composition represented in the Compustat population, is financial services (6.91 vs. 
31.42 percent).  This difference is likely due to OCI-related data limitations for financial firms.  
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Nonetheless, we include industry effects in all empirical models to ensure that our results are not 
driven by industry-specific factors. 
-- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE -- 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our 13,455 sample observations.  With respect to our 
dependent variables, the mean (median) value for AnaDisp is 0.26 (0.07), the mean (median) 
AnaInacc value is 0.65 (0.16), and RetVol and CumRet have mean (median) values of 0.03 (0.03) 
and 0.13 (0.08), respectively.  Among our main independent variables, OCIGain and OCILoss 
have mean (median) values of 0.33 (0.24) and 0.36 (0.29), respectively.  Further, the average 
firm in our sample is profitable, with mean (median) Erngs of 1.17 (1.03).  Notable statistics 
among the control variables include CashFlow, for which the mean (median) value of 3.03 (2.24) 
indicate that the average firm in our sample has positive operating cash flows.  
-- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE -- 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables in our models.  The 
primary concern here is the potential for harmful collinearity among the independent variables.  
The highest correlation among the independent variables is 0.74 between CFVol and ROAVol, 
which approaches a level sufficient to raise concern.  Two other correlations also exceed 0.6 
(0.65 between CashFlow and BookVal and -0.65 between CashFlow and Accruals).  All other 
correlation coefficients are below 0.6.  Overall, Table 2 suggests that collinearity is likely not a 
problem in our data.  Nonetheless, we perform a sensitivity test to ensure that our findings are 
not driven by the one very high correlation noted above.  Specifically, we re-estimate equation 
(1) omitting CFVol.  Our results for equation (1) remain qualitatively the same as those for the 
initial specification, which are discussed below. 
-- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE – 
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IV.  EMPIRICIAL RESULTS 
Main Regression Results 
Main regression results are presented in Tables 4 and 5, and significance levels are 
determined based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level.  Table 4 presents 
baseline results for a reduced version of equation (1) that does not include the interactions 
between Erngs and the OCI variable.  R-squared values range from about 8 percent to about 64 
percent.  The coefficients on OCIGain, OCILoss, and Erngs are all significantly negative at least 
at the 0.10 level in the AnaDisp, AnaInacc, and RetVol models.  These results suggest that, 
individually, earnings, OCI gains, and OCI losses provide information to the market that reduces 
uncertainty and disagreement among market participants about firms’ fundamentals.  In addition, 
Erngs (OCILoss) is positive (negative) in the CumRet model (p < 0.01) as one might expect, 
indicating that investors impound the corresponding economic gains and losses into share prices.  
OCIGain is insignificantly positive in the CumRet model.   
-- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE -- 
Several of the control variables are significant across the four models.  PPE is significantly 
positive at least at the 0.05 level in every model.  ROAVol is also positive in every model, 
significantly so (p < 0.01) in all but the CumRet model.  Conversely, Intang is significantly 
negative (p < 0.01) in all but the CumRet model, where it is significantly positive (p < 0.01).  
BookVal is also significant in every model, at least at the 0.05 level, but is directionally 
inconsistent across the four models.  OutShrs is significantly negative (p < 0.01) in the RetVol 
and CumRet models, while CFVol is significant (positive; p < 0.01) only in the RetVol model. 
Table 5 reports results for the full specification of equation (1) that includes the interactions 
between Erngs and the OCI variables.  R-squared values and results for the control variables are 
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virtually identical to those in Table 4 across the four models.  With one exception, the signs and 
significance of the coefficients on Erngs, OCIGain, and OCILoss are consistent with those 
reported in Table 4 as well.  The one exception is OCILoss in the CumRet model, which remains 
negative but is now not significant.   
-- INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE -- 
We focus on the interactions between Erngs and the OCI variables for our hypothesis tests.  
As predicted, Erngs*OCIGain is positive in the AnaDisp, AnaInacc, and RetVol models (H1) and 
negative in the CumRet model (H2) and is significant at least at the 0.05 level in all but the 
AnaInacc model.  Similarly, Erngs*OCILoss is positive in the AnaDisp, AnaInacc, and RetVol 
models (H1) and negative in the CumRet model (H2) and is highly significant in every case (p < 
0.01).  These results provide support for both of our hypotheses and suggest that although OCI 
gains and losses provide useful information to the market, that information negatively impacts 
market participants’ ability to process earnings.  Specifically, reported OCI gains and 
(especially) losses interact with reported earnings in such a way as to increase uncertainty and 
disagreement among market participants about earnings and weaken the association between 
earnings and stock returns. 
OCI and Components of Earnings 
In our main tests, we examine how OCI gains and losses impact the market’s processing of 
earnings.  We next explore whether our main results are concentrated in one or more components 
of earnings.  Specifically, we repeat the analyses report in Table 5 decomposing Erngs into its 
accrual (Accruals) and operating cash flow (CashFlow) components, interacting both 
(separately) with OCI gains and losses.  The results for this test are reported in Table 6.  As in 
our main analysis, R-squared values and results for the control variables are virtually identical to 
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those in Table 4 across the four models.  Further, the results for the OCI variables remain 
consistent with those reported in Table 4, although OCIGain is now significantly positive (p < 
0.05) and OCILoss is insignificantly negative in the CumRet model.  Both components of 
earnings (i.e., CashFlow and Accruals) consistently show highly significant (p < 0.01) 
coefficients that are negative in the AnaDisp, AnaInacc, and RetVol models and positive in the 
CumRet model, indicating that the useful information provided to the market by earnings is 
attributable to both its cash flow and accrual components. 
-- INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE -- 
Looking to the interactions between the earnings components and the OCI variables, the 
results in Table 6 suggest that our main (i.e., Table 5) findings are generally applicable to both 
cash flows and accruals.  Specifically, consistent with the results in Table 5, both 
CashFlow*OCILoss and Accruals*OCILoss are highly significant in every model (p < 0.01), 
positively so in the AnaDisp, AnaInacc, and RetVol models and negatively so in the CumRet 
model.  Results are weaker for the interaction between earnings and OCI gains.  Similar to the 
corresponding results in Table 5, CashFlow*OCIGain is positive in the AnaDisp, AnaInacc, and 
RetVol models, significantly so in the AnaDisp (p < 0.10) and RetVol (p < 0.01) models, and is 
significantly negative (p < 0.01) in the CumRet model.  However, Accruals*OCIGain is 
marginally significant (p < 0.10) only in the CumRet model, where it is also negative.  These 
results suggest that OCI losses strongly and negatively impact the market’s processing of both 
the cash flow and accrual components of earnings, but the clouding effects of OCI gains are 





The Impact of the Information Environment 
Given the implications of our results for how the market processes accounting information, 
we next consider whether the broader information environment plays a role in our setting.  
Specifically, we examine whether our main (i.e., Table 5) results vary by the strength of the 
information environment.  To do this, we repeat the analyses reported in Table 5 separately for 
subsets of our sample where the information environment is relatively strong and weak.  Based 
on prior research, we proxy for the strength of the information environment using analyst 
following; observations with a value of Coverage in the highest (Coverage = High) and lowest 
(Coverage = Low) quintiles of the sample distribution represent relatively strong and weak 
information environments, respectively. 
The results for this analysis are reported in Table 7.  The findings for OCILoss and Erngs are 
consistent with the corresponding results in Table 5 in both the weak and strong information 
environment settings, with the one exception that OCILoss is now insignificant in the CumRet 
model where analyst coverage is low.  Accordingly, OCI losses and reported earnings appear to 
be associated with reduced uncertainty and disagreement among market participants regardless 
of the broader information environment.  Moreover, while investors predictably incorporate 
earnings into share prices at some level regardless of the information environment, they 
incorporate OCI losses into share prices only where the information environment is relatively 
strong.  OCIGain is significant (negative; p < 0.01) only in the RetVol model where analyst 
following is relatively low, suggesting that OCI gains generally do not directly influence market 
uncertainty/disagreement or factor into share prices at the high or low ends of the analyst 
following distribution. 
-- INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE -- 
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Turning to our hypothesized interactions, Erngs*OCILoss is significantly positive (at least at 
the 0.10 level) in the AnaDisp, AnaInacc, and RetVol models and significantly negative (at least 
at the 0.10 level) in the CumRet model in all cases, i.e., in both the strong and weak information 
environment conditions.  As our findings for the interaction between earnings and OCI losses 
appear to be consistent across strong vs. weak information environments, we compare the 
coefficients on Erngs*OCILoss across the Coverage = Low and Coverage = High conditions in 
each model using Wald statistics.  The coefficient on Erngs*OCILoss is more strongly positive 
(negative) for the Coverage = Low case relative to the Coverage = High case in the AnaDisp, 
AnaInacc, and RetVol (CumRet) models, and significantly so (at least at the 0.05 level) in all but 
the AnaDisp model.  These results suggest that the clouding effects of OCI losses on market 
participants’ ability to process earnings are more pronounced where the information environment 
is relatively weak compared to where it is relatively strong, as one might expect.   
The comparative results for Erngs*OCIGain in the Coverage = Low vs. Coverage = High 
cases are similar.  Erngs*OCIGain is strongly significantly positive (p < 0.01) in the AnaDisp 
and RetVol models and significantly negative (p < 0.01) in the CumRet model only in the 
Coverage = Low condition; it is not significant in the Coverage = High condition in any model.  
Further, Erngs*OCIGain is not significant in either of the information environment conditions in 
the AnaInacc model.  These results generally suggest that, similar to OCI losses, the negative 
effects of OCI gains on market participants’ ability to process earnings present most strongly 
where the information environment is relatively weak. 
Summary 
Overall, our results provide evidence that although OCI gains and losses provide useful 
information to market participants directly, they also have a negative indirect effect on market 
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participants’ ability to assess firms’ fundamentals.  Specifically, consistent with prior evidence, 
reported earnings and OCI gains and losses are associated with reduced uncertainty and 
disagreement among market participants and are positively impounded into share prices by 
investors.  However, the informational effects of earnings are weakened as OCI gains and/or 
losses increase.  Further, the clouding effects of OCI items on the market’s ability to process 
earnings present more consistently for OCI losses than OCI gains.  Finally, these clouding effects 
manifest more strongly in weaker information environments than in stronger ones, suggesting 
that a stronger information environment (higher analyst following in our case) provides market 
participants with the tools to generally retain the informational benefits provided by OCI items 
directly while mitigating any confusing or noisy elements contained therein that may affect 
interpretation of other financial statement items.        
 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study examines whether OCI items impact market participants’ ability to process other 
accounting information, specifically earnings.  That is, we investigate whether 1) the associations 
between earnings and measures of uncertainty and disagreement among market participants 
(analyst forecast dispersion, analyst forecast error, and stock return volatility) and 2) the value-
relevance of earnings are affected by the presence of OCI gain and losses.  Based on the 
unpredictable and volatile nature of OCI items, we argue that OCI gains and losses affect the 
way that market participants processes other accounting information, generating uncertainty and 
disagreement around that information.  We predict that the association between earnings and 
investor heterogeneity is stronger in the presence of OCI. 
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Our results are consistent with this prediction.  We find that reported earnings and OCI gains 
and losses are individually associated with reduced uncertainty and disagreement among market 
participants and are positively impounded into share prices by investors.  However, we also find 
that both OCI gains and losses interact with earnings so as to weaken the negative relation 
between earnings and market uncertainty/disagreement and the value-relevance of earnings.  
Further, we find that the negative effects of OCI items on the market’s ability to process earnings 
are more consistently evident for OCI losses than OCI gains.  Finally, we find that the apparent 
effects of OCI gains and losses on market participants’ processing of earnings information 
manifest more strongly in weaker information environments than in stronger ones, as measured 
by analyst following. 
Our results are consistent with OCI gains and losses providing useful information to market 
participants directly, but also having a negative indirect effect on market participants’ ability to 
assess firms’ fundamentals.  Our results also suggest that a stronger information environment 
enables market participants to generally retain the informational benefits provided by OCI items 
directly while reducing or eliminating any confusing or noisy elements contained therein that 
may affect interpretation of other financial statement items. 
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AnaDisp = The standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts on EPS during 0 to 15 days after the 
earnings announcement date for year t deflated by beginning-of-year stock price. 
AnaInacc = The absolute value of bias, which is calculated as analysts' forecast consensus less 
actual reported earnings per share in year t (IBES ACTUAL) deflated by begnning-
of-year stock price. Analysts' consensus is the average of analysts' earnings 
forecasts during 0 to 15 days after the earnings announcement date for year t.
CumRet = The cumulative abnormal return for firm i over the one-year period from the 
second quarter of year t to the first quarter of year t+1. Abnormal returns are 
captured using the difference between expected returns and the market risk free 
rate. RetVol = The standard deviation of daily stock returns for firm i over the one-year period 
from the second quarter of year t to the first quarter of year t+1.
Accruals = The difference between income before extraordinary items (Compustat IB) and 
operating cash flows (Compustat OANCF) in year t deflated by the number of 
outstanding shares. 
BookVal = Shareholders' equity (Compustat CEQ) deflated by number of outstanding shares. 
CashFlow = Operating cash flows (Compustat OANCF) deflated by the number of outstanding 
shares. 
CFVol = The standard deviation of operating cash flows for firm i from year t-5 to year t 
deflated by prior year total assets.  
Coverage = The natural logarithm of the number of distinct analysts following firm i during 0 
to 15 days after the earnings announcement date for year t.  
Intang = Intangible assets including goodwill at the end of year t (Compustat INTAN) 
deflated by prior year total assets. 
Erngs = Net income before extraordinary items in year t (Compustat IB) deflated by the 
number of outstanding shares. 
OCIGain = The absolute value of OCI gains in year t deflated by the number of outstanding 
shares. OCI gains are defined as the sum of all the positive derivatibe gains/losses 
(Compustat CIDERGL), securities gains/losses (Compustat CISECGL), currency 
translation adjustments (Compustat CICURR), noncontrolling interest (Compustat 
CIMII), other adjustments (Compustat CIOTHER), and minimum pension 
adjustments (Compustat CIPEN).
OCILoss = The absolute value of OCI losses in year t deflated by the number of outstanding 
shares. OCI losses are defined as the sum of all the negative derivatibe gains/losses 
(Compustat CIDERGL), securities gains/losses (Compustat CISECGL), currency 
translation adjustments (Compustat CICURR), noncontrolling interest (Compustat 
CIMII), other adjustments (Compustat CIOTHER), and minimum pension 
adjustments (Compustat CIPEN).
OutShrs = The natural log of the number of shares outstanding for firm i at the end of year t.
PPE = Property, plant and equipment at the end of year t (Compustat PPENT) deflated 
by prior year total assets. 
ROAVol = The standard deviation of ROA for firm i from year t-5 to year t. ROA is income 
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N
Industry Sample Sample Compustat
Natural resources 1,066 7.92 6.89
Construction and metal 657 4.88 3.31
Food 573 4.26 3.03
Consumer goods 381 2.83 1.96
Paper and printing 283 2.10 1.34
Chemical and petroleum 1,280 9.51 7.55
Machinery and equipment 2,846 21.15 15.18
Transportation-related 952 7.08 4.19
Telecommunications 435 3.23 2.83
Wholesale and retail 1,149 8.54 5.66
Entertainment 180 1.34 1.14
Business services 1,793 13.33 10.12
Health services 209 1.55 1.17
Utilities 483 3.59 3.58
Financial Services 930 6.91 31.42
Other 238 1.78 0.63
     Total 13,455 100.00 100.00
%
Table 1
Firm-Year Observations by Industry Group
Description of Sample
 
Industries are defined on the basis of two-digit SIC codes as follows.  Natural Resources: 0-9,10-14; Construction/Metal: 15-19, 
30, 32-34; Food: 20-21; Consumer Goods: 22-23, 25, 31, 39; Paper/Printing: 24, 26-27; Chemical/Petroleum: 28-29; 
Machinery/Equipment: 35-36, 38; Transportation: 37, 40-47; Telecommunication: 48;  Wholesale/Retail: 50-59; Entertainment: 
78-79; Business Services: 73, 81; Health Services: 70, 72, 75-76, 80, 82-89; Utilities: 49; Financial Services: 60-63, 65-67; 
Other: 99.  “% Compustat” indicates the percentage of all firms on Compustat in 2010 (largest concentration of firm-years 
toward the middle of the sample period) represented in each industry.  
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75%
   AnaDisp 0.255 0.591 0.026 0.069 0.200
   AnaInacc 0.646 1.617 0.056 0.159 0.457
   RetVol 0.028 0.015 0.018 0.025 0.036
   CumRet 0.132 0.576 -0.244 0.081 0.390
   OCIGain 0.327 0.332 0.000 0.236 0.617
   OCILoss 0.359 0.340 0.000 0.294 0.669
   Erngs 1.167 2.547 0.013 1.034 2.269
   BookVal 13.007 11.530 4.980 10.075 17.961
   Accruals -1.870 2.984 -2.473 -1.109 -0.346
   CashFlow 3.025 3.421 0.856 2.236 4.251
   PPE 0.286 0.284 0.070 0.180 0.426
   Intang 0.212 0.244 0.019 0.128 0.331
   CFVol 0.060 0.081 0.022 0.039 0.066
   ROAVol 0.076 0.122 0.018 0.036 0.084
   OutShrs 11.187 1.165 10.362 11.008 11.860




See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
   1. AnaDisp 1.00
   2. AnaInacc 0.72 1.00
   3. RetVol 0.25 0.23 1.00
   4. CumRet -0.14 -0.13 -0.22 1.00
   5. OCIGain -0.10 -0.09 -0.17 0.10 1.00
   6. OCILoss -0.07 -0.06 -0.17 -0.13 0.06 1.00
   7. Erngs -0.26 -0.24 -0.44 0.21 0.23 0.20 1.00
   8. BookVal -0.11 -0.11 -0.32 0.02 0.30 0.28 0.49 1.00
   9. Accruals -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 0.12 -0.16 -0.16 0.25 -0.31 1.00
   10. CashFlow -0.12 -0.13 -0.27 0.06 0.31 0.29 0.55 0.65 -0.65 1.00
   11. PPE 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.13 -0.25 0.25 1.00
   12. Intang -0.10 -0.09 -0.15 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.28 1.00
   13. CFVol 0.09 0.07 0.29 0.03 -0.22 -0.23 -0.20 -0.27 0.14 -0.27 -0.16 -0.13 1.00
   14. ROAVol 0.14 0.11 0.34 -0.01 -0.21 -0.20 -0.30 -0.30 0.05 -0.28 -0.14 -0.10 0.74 1.00
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Independent Variables Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
   Intercept 0.2386 0.59 0.4854 3.46 *** 0.0365 20.73 *** 0.6414 3.57 ***
Earnings and OCI Variables
   OCIGain -0.0316 -1.76 * -0.1047 -2.32 ** -0.0009 -2.66 *** 0.0003 0.02
   OCILoss -0.0553 -2.96 *** -0.0991 -1.94 * -0.0013 -4.03 *** -0.0386 -2.70 ***
   Erngs -0.0529 -16.63 *** -0.1375 -15.25 *** -0.0012 -22.29 *** 0.0491 23.45 ***
Control Variables
   BookVal 0.0013 2.11 ** 0.0033 1.99 ** -0.0001 -8.20 *** -0.0043 -9.23 ***
   PPE 0.1431 4.08 *** 0.2146 2.31 ** 0.0022 3.79 *** 0.0599 2.49 **
   Intang -0.1192 -4.66 *** -0.3796 -5.46 *** -0.0024 -4.96 *** 0.1124 5.06 ***
   CFVol 0.0574 0.41 -0.0192 -0.05 0.0128 4.85 *** 0.1765 1.55
   ROAVol 0.3021 3.44 *** 0.7634 3.19 *** 0.0190 11.12 *** 0.0047 0.07
   OutShrs -0.0015 -15.41 *** -0.0217 -5.40 ***
N      13,455      13,455      13,455      13,455
F-stat.      16.78   (p < 0.01)      12.15   (p < 0.01)      149.38   (p < 0.01)      111.45   (p < 0.01)
R-squared  (Adjusted)      0.113      0.080      0.635      0.283
Table 4
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Regression Results




***, **, and * indicate significance for a two-tailed test at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  The dependent variables are AnaDisp, AnaInacc, RetVol, and 
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Independent Variables Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
   Intercept 0.0698 1.80 0.5925 3.81 *** 0.0382 22.99 *** 0.6007 3.37 ***
Earnings and OCI Variables
   OCIGain -0.0488 -1.96 ** -0.1301 -2.11 ** -0.0017 -4.40 *** 0.0229 1.32
   OCILoss -0.0991 -4.13 *** -0.2084 -3.18 *** -0.0026 -6.62 *** -0.0076 -0.49
   Erngs -0.0764 -12.80 *** -0.1917 -11.70 *** -0.0020 -19.60 *** 0.0686 17.75 ***
   Erngs*OCIGain 0.0142 2.04 ** 0.0236 1.26 0.0007 5.72 *** -0.0171 -3.67 ***
   Erngs*OCILoss 0.0347 5.01 *** 0.0864 4.50 *** 0.0010 9.04 *** -0.0250 -5.88 ***
Control Variables
   BookVal 0.0012 1.97 ** 0.0032 1.90 * -0.0001 -8.77 *** -0.0042 -9.04 ***
   PPE 0.1568 4.53 *** 0.2451 2.66 *** 0.0027 4.65 *** 0.0478 1.98 **
   Intang -0.1131 -4.44 *** -0.3664 -5.26 *** -0.0021 -4.54 *** 0.1069 4.84 ***
   CFVol 0.0606 0.44 -0.0140 -0.04 0.0130 4.97 *** 0.1732 1.52
   ROAVol 0.2573 2.88 *** 0.6646 2.74 *** 0.0174 10.21 *** 0.0444 0.64
   OutShrs -0.0015 -15.70 *** -0.0214 -5.38 ***
N      13,455      13,455      13,455      13,455
F-stat.      17.02   (p < 0.01)      12.58   (p < 0.01)      152.50   (p < 0.01)      107.36   (p < 0.01)
R-squared  (Adjusted)      0.116      0.082      0.641      0.285
Dependent Variable
Table 5
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Regression Results
Earnings and OCI
AnaDisp AnaInacc RetVol CumRet
 
***, **, and * indicate significance for a two-tailed test at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  The dependent variables are AnaDisp, AnaInacc, RetVol, and 
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Independent Variables Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
   Intercept 0.0663 1.71 0.6014 4.08 *** 0.0386 22.90 *** 0.6064 3.40 ***
Earnings and OCI Variables
   OCIGain -0.0871 -3.41 *** -0.2667 -3.97 *** -0.0027 -6.20 *** 0.0448 2.05 **
   OCILoss -0.1005 -3.77 *** -0.2079 -2.81 *** -0.0035 -7.63 *** -0.0161 -0.80
   CashFlow -0.0673 -8.82 *** -0.1825 -9.28 *** -0.0019 -10.74 *** 0.0679 11.48 ***
   Accruals -0.0589 -7.25 *** -0.1428 -6.99 *** -0.0016 -9.81 *** 0.0565 10.88 ***
   CashFlow*OCIGain 0.0139 1.87 * 0.0297 1.49 0.0006 4.40 *** -0.0193 -3.40 ***
   CashFlow*OCILoss 0.0291 3.64 *** 0.0758 3.51 *** 0.0010 6.26 *** -0.0222 -3.85 ***
   Accruals*OCIGain -0.0011 -0.12 -0.0272 -1.14 0.0002 1.50 -0.0095 -1.71 *
   Accruals*OCILoss 0.0269 2.87 *** 0.0672 2.82 *** 0.0007 4.09 *** -0.0226 -4.15 ***
Control Variables
   BookVal 0.0009 1.33 0.0037 2.04 ** -0.0001 -8.85 *** -0.0049 -9.39 ***
   PPE 0.1587 4.39 *** 0.2711 2.85 *** 0.0028 4.62 *** 0.0368 1.48
   Intang -0.1103 -4.28 *** -0.3552 -5.04 *** -0.0020 -4.15 *** 0.1063 4.75 ***
   CFVol 0.0548 0.40 -0.0580 -0.15 0.0128 4.93 *** 0.1700 1.46
   ROAVol 0.2683 2.98 *** 0.6823 2.78 *** 0.0173 9.93 *** 0.0444 0.62
   OutShrs -0.0015 -15.42 *** -0.0216 -5.36 ***
N      13,455      13,455      13,455      13,455
F-stat.      15.88   (p < 0.01)      11.16   (p < 0.01)      149.33   (p < 0.01)      103.25   (p < 0.01)
R-squared  (Adjusted)      0.111      0.081      0.639      0.284
Table 6
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Regression Results
Accruals, Operating Cash Flows, and OCI
Dependent Variable
AnaDisp AnaInacc RetVol CumRet
 
***, **, and * indicate significance for a two-tailed test at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  The dependent variables are AnaDisp, AnaInacc, RetVol, and 
CumRet.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
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Independent Variables Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
   Intercept 0.2438 1.64 -0.1705 -1.35 1.1100 2.63 *** 0.0008 0.00 0.0319 4.58 *** 0.0324 7.67 *** 0.5233 1.52 1.3687 2.35 **
Earnings and OCI Variables
   OCIGain -0.0531 -1.22 0.0267 0.42 -0.1197 -0.93 0.0085 0.06 -0.0024 -3.18 *** -0.0012 -1.55 0.0457 1.40 -0.0435 -1.19
   OCILoss -0.1357 -3.14 *** -0.1659 -2.98 *** -0.3126 -2.31 ** -0.2229 -1.65 * -0.0039 -5.49 *** -0.0017 -2.21 ** 0.0126 0.43 -0.0768 -2.16 **
   Erngs -0.1257 -9.71 *** -0.0544 -4.40 *** -0.3238 -8.55 *** -0.1102 -3.55 *** -0.0028 -12.02 *** -0.0012 -8.33 *** 0.1197 11.96 *** 0.0416 6.53 ***
   Erngs*OCIGain 0.0445 2.76 *** -0.0016 -0.13 0.0221 0.50 0.0200 0.65 0.0011 4.06 *** 0.0001 0.63 -0.0441 -4.01 *** 0.0029 0.39
   Erngs*OCILoss 0.0725 4.55 *** 0.0382 2.63 *** 0.1905 4.09 *** 0.0593 1.67 * 0.0015 5.31 *** 0.0008 4.65 *** -0.0640 -5.77 *** -0.0139 -1.81 *
Control Variables
   BookVal 0.0013 1.08 0.0012 0.97 0.0055 1.28 0.0030 1.01 -0.0002 -8.67 *** 0.0000 -0.49 -0.0052 -5.57 *** -0.0026 -2.86 ***
   PPE 0.1463 1.95 * 0.2558 3.26 *** 0.3413 1.66 * 0.1910 0.92 0.0017 1.54 0.0046 4.09 *** -0.0600 -1.19 -0.0159 -0.30
   Intang -0.0826 -1.54 -0.0164 -0.21 -0.3869 -2.53 ** -0.0694 -0.46 -0.0007 -0.66 -0.0011 -1.13 0.0742 1.55 0.1194 2.54 **
   CFVol -0.0913 -0.48 0.8899 1.99 ** -0.6939 -1.12 2.9375 2.48 ** 0.0085 1.97 ** 0.0305 4.76 *** 0.1871 0.95 0.3849 0.93
   ROAVol 0.0737 0.58 0.6156 2.60 *** 0.3212 0.74 1.7295 2.87 *** 0.0154 5.22 *** 0.0229 5.53 *** -0.0152 -0.13 -0.1410 -0.72
   OutShrs -0.0009 -3.83 *** -0.0016 -8.02 *** -0.0311 -3.26 *** -0.0178 -1.72 *
N      3,879      2,361      3,879      2,361      3,879      2,361      3,879      2,361
F-stat.      6.28   (p < 0.01)      7.37   (p < 0.01)      5.58   (p < 0.01)      5.22   (p < 0.01)      56.62   (p < 0.01)      71.69   (p < 0.01)      38.90   (p < 0.01)      14.05   (p < 0.01)
R-squared  (Adjusted)      0.098      0.161      0.082      0.113      0.631      0.683      0.283      0.285
Effect Size with High vs. Low








   Erngs*OCIGain 5.31 ## 0.00 10.93 ### 12.66 ###
   Erngs*OCILoss 2.55 5.14 ## 4.96 ## 14.30 ###
Table 7
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Regression Results
Earnings and OCI by Level of Analyst Following
Coverage = High Coverage = Low Coverage = High
Dependent Variable
AnaDisp AnaInacc RetVol CumRet
Coverage = HighCoverage = Low Coverage = Low Coverage = High Coverage = Low
 
***, **, and * indicate significance for a two-tailed test at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  ### and ## indicate significance for a χ2 test at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively.  The dependent variables are AnaDisp, AnaInacc, RetVol, and CumRet.  Coverage = High represents the highest quintile of the sample distribution of 
Coverage.  Coverage = Low represents the lowest quintile of the sample distribution of Coverage.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
